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The human capital-augmented Solow model (Mankiw et al., 1992) has been criticized by Cho
and Graham (1996) by stating that half of all countries converge to their steady state from above,
i.e. from income levels above those obtained in their steady state. This is clearly at odds with the
general idea that countries approach their steady state from a backward position. In this paper we
will argue that this result is primarily due to the assumption of an identical exogenous rate of
technological progress for all countries. Once different rates of technological progress are
introduced into the model, the number of countries approaching their steady state from above is
reduced to a number more in line with what the augmented Solow model would predict.
However, for a sample consisting of 98 non-oil countries, the assumption of constant returns to
scale has to be rejected. For the non-oil sample our analysis thus both supports and challenges
the human capital-augmented Solow model. For a more limited sample consisting of 22 OECD
countries, the results clearly support the augmented Solow model by both reducing the number
of countries converging from above their steady state to zero and by accepting the assumption
of constant returns to scale.1
1.  Introduction
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992; from here on abbreviated as MRW) have augmented the Solow
(1956) growth model by including human capital. They estimated the Solow model using a linear
approximation of the transition process towards the steady state. Cho and Graham (1996; from
here on abbreviated as CG) criticize MRW by pointing out that 49 of the 98 countries in MRW’s
non-oil sample approach the steady state from per capita income levels that are above those of
the steady state; this result is somewhat at odds with the usual story that countries converge from
being poor to their steady state.
In this paper we start out from the suspicion that this somewhat surprising result is due to the fact
that CG have assumed a common rate of labor-augmenting technological progress of 2% for all
98 countries in the non-oil sample. However, the empirical research of Young (1994) yielded
zero total factor productivity (TFP) growth for 52 out of the 118 countries of the Summers and
Heston (1988) data set. In the light of these results one might guess that for about half of all
countries the rate of technological progress is zero rather than 2%. In a Solow model a
technological progress rate of 2% yields a lower steady-state value of the capital-labor ratio than
a rate of zero. Therefore, the hypothesis of this paper is that getting the rates of technological
progress right would bring many countries from values larger than the steady state to values
lower than the steady state simply because the steady-state values for the capital-labor ratio are
increased for many countries with rates of technological progress lower than 2%.
To see whether or not this hypothesis is correct we will recalculate the CG results by substituting
country-specific rates of technological progress. First, in section 2, we use Young’s TFP data to
obtain rates of labor-augmenting technological progress. By replacing the value of 2% used by
CG by these rates, and re-estimating the model and finally recalculating the steady state per
capita income levels, we reduce the number of countries that approach the steady state from the
‘wrong’ side. However, the reduction is only a minor from 49 to 43 countries in the non-oil
sample, which is still quite a few more countries than one might expect. For our second sample,
including 22 OECD countries, this number even increases from 4 to 7.2
In section 3 we will discuss a number of problems using Young’s TFP growth rates. Taking these
problems into account, we then calculate an alternative set of TFP growth rates using the
Summers and Heston data set. In section 4 we use these new TFP growth rates to re-estimate the
MRW model and to recalculate the results of CG, showing that 35 countries approach their
steady state per capita income level from above. For the OECD sample, this number even
decreases to only 2. Although particularly for the non-oil sample the result is far from perfect,
this result is closer to what one would expect from a Solowian perspective.
In section 5 we will extend the analysis by including changes in human capital endowments in
the calculation of TFP growth rates. We will consider two different proxies for human capital
growth: changes in the enrollment ratio for secondary education and changes in the average years
of secondary education. The latter is the bext proxy both theoretically and empirically. For the
non-oil sample, the number of countries approaching their steady state from above will be
reduced to only 25. For the OECD sample we see no improvement, as there are still 2 countries
converging from above.
Although the augmented Solow model predicts a negative sign for the variable including labor
growth and technological progress, our empirical results show the opposite, i.e. a positive sign.
As this might be due to a model misspecification, we drop the assumption of constant returns to
scale (abbreviated to CRS) in section 6. CRS can now only be obtained by introducing so-called
‘B-type technological change’, which is composed of the standard concept of technological
change and labor growth. Using human capital-adjusted TFP growth rates, the number of
countries approaching their steady state from above is reduced to 22 in the non-oil sample. For
the OECD sample we find a perfect result as all countries approach their steady state from below.
In section 7 we explicitly test for CRS by estimating a set of restricted regressions. Although the
results improve for the non-oil sample because the number of countries approaching from above
is reduced to 16, the regression results force us to reject the assumption of CRS for this sample.
The assumption of CRS can be confirmed for the OECD sample.
In section 8 we will draw conclusions based on the analyses of the previous sections. For the non-































model is supported by the reduced number of countries approaching their steady state from
above. However, one of the basic assumptions of the augmented Solow model,  the assumption
of CRS, has to be strongly rejected. For the OECD sample, the support is more convincing as
both the assumption of CRS cannot be rejected, and the number of countries approaching their
steady state from above is reduced to zero.
2.  The Solow-MRW Model: Manipulations and Empirical Results by Cho and Graham
MRW have augmented the standard Solow model by adding human capital to the production
function and by adding a human capital accumulation function. This augmented Solow-MRW




where Y is output, K physical capital, H human capital, L labor, and A the level of technology.
The production function assumes CRS in all production inputs. Both labor and technology are
assumed to grow exogenously at rates n and g. Both physical and human capital are accumulated
by investing a fraction  and   of output respectively, and both are assumed to depreciate at the
rate  . The accumulation functions are expressed in units of effective labor:  , 
and  . MRW solve this model in order to find the solution for the level of steady state
per capita income at time t,  :































  Note that in the original MRW model, the g in equation (3) is not included.
1
  Note that the model predicts that  ,  ,  ,  and  .
2
  The procedure to derive this equation is similar to that of deriving equation (3b’) in Cho and
3
Graham (1996).
  These regression results are given in Table 1.
4
4
CG manipulate the human capital-augmented Solow-MRW model to estimate steady state per
capita income in the base year, i.e.  . Using MRW’s equation (2), they approximate the model
around the steady state :
1
(3)
where   is the rate of convergence, in order to find the following relation
for per capita income growth:
(4)
where the  parameters are defined as:  ,  ,
,  , and  .
Equation (4) can now be used to estimate the parameters  ,  ,  ,   and  .  These are then
2
substituted in equation (5)  to calculate steady state per capita income in the base year:
3
(5)
Using the regression results from MRW’s sample of 98 non-oil countries for the period 1960 -
1985 , and assuming an exogenous growth rate of technological change g of 2%, CG calculate
4
the steady-state levels of per capita income for these countries in 1960. It turns out that half of





  Only those 22 countries have been included that were an OECD member in 1985 (thereby
5
excluding the Czech Republic, Hungary, the Republic of Korea, Mexico and Poland) and countries for
which data were available (thereby excluding Iceland and Luxembourg).
5
per capita income for only 49 countries. Moreover, Cho and Graham conclude that there is a
difference between rich and poor countries: “[o]n average, relatively poor countries converge to
their steady-state position from above, while rich countries converge from below”. Of the 22
OECD countries in this sample, there are indeed only 5 countries which were above their 1960
steady state: Canada, New Zealand, Switzerland, the UK, and the US.
Table 1 ‘Steady-state’ regression results: Cho & Graham and Young’s TFP data
#
Non-oil
(1) MRW-CG 3.022 -0.288 -0.506 0.524 0.231 0.463 49 (98)
(3.651) (-4.683) (-1.752) (6.029) (3.887)
(2) Young 3.991 -0.143 0.419 0.474 0.139 0.530 43 (98)
(7.109) (-2.413) (4.093) (5.749) (2.408)
OECD
(3) MRW-CG 2.755 -0.398 -0.863 0.332 0.228 0.651 4 (22)
(2.294) (-5.668) (-2.557) (1.914) (1.570)
(4) Young 5.064 -0.363 0.157 0.327 0.126 0.541 7 (22)
(5.295) (-4.331) (0.933) (1.583) (0.751)
Regression equation: 
t-values in parentheses; # = number of countries converging from above the steady state (total number of
countries)
Table 1 also shows the regression results for our second sample, consisting of 22 OECD
countries.  When the same procedure is repeated for these 22 countries, the estimated coefficients
5
are close to those for the non-oil sample. However, both ‘catching-up’, as expressed by the
parameter  , and the ‘technology variable’   seem to be relatively more significant
in explaining economic growth. Human capital seems to be less important in explaining OECD
economic growth. Although, due to a smaller disparity in growth performance, one would expect
that there would be fewer OECD countries converging from above their steady state, Table 16
shows that there are still 4 countries which convergence from above. With the exception of the
UK, these are the same countries as those found in the non-oil sample.
The MRW-CG results for the non-oil sample contradict the ‘stylised fact’ that countries approach
their steady state from a relatively backward position (i.e. from below). One explanation for this
result could be the assumption of a 2% growth rate of labor-augmenting technological progress
for all countries. As reported by, for example, Young (1994), technological progress is different
between countries. For about half of the countries in his sample, Young finds that this growth
rate is not 2% but zero. The introduction of different growth rates for technological change
should improve the CG result by resulting in lower steady-state values. As the Solow model
predicts that a higher rate of technological change results in lower steady-state values of the
capital-labor ratio, allowing for technological growth rates smaller than the CG assumption of
2% will increase the steady-state capital-labor ratios and thus steady state per capita income.
3.  Introducing Country-Specific TFP Growth Rates: Young’s TFP Data
CG find that in 1960 50% of the 98 countries in the non-oil sample converge from above their
steady state. As this result is conflicting with the general notion that countries approach their
steady state from below, we will improve this result – i.e., reduce the number of countries
‘approaching from above’ – by allowing for different rates of technological progress among the
sample countries. In this section we will use total factor productivity (TFP) data as constructed
by Young (1994) to adjust the CG result.
Young (1994) uses the Summers and Heston (1988) data set to construct capital stock data
necessary for estimating TFP growth rates. Assuming a depreciation rate of 6%, 1960-1969
investment flows are accumulated to estimate a benchmark capital stock for 1970. Capital stocks
for the sample period 1970-1985 are then calculated by using this benchmark capital stock and
the 1970-1985 investment flows. Finally, Young performs a cross-country regression of per
capita income growth on the growth rate of the capital-labor ratio:ˆ Yt	 ˆ Lt






  I.e., Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain and the UK.
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  The 10 countries approaching from above are Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece,
7
Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the UK.
7
(6)
where E  is the residual term. The parameters were estimated to be   and  . TFP
growth rates are then calculated as the sum of the average TFP growth  and the country-specific
residual. For the non-oil countries, the TFP estimates of Young are given in Appendix A. For
only 54 of these 98 countries TFP growth rates are non-negative.
We now use these TFP growth rates to introduce different rates of technological progress.
Multiplying these TFP growth rates by 3 – roughly the inverse of labor’s share of income – gives
the rates of labor-augmenting technological progress. Substituting these for g in regression
equation (4) gives the regression results as reported in Table 1. Most parameter estimates are
close to those of MRW-CG. The estimate of the “technology parameter”  , however,
is of opposite sign. A possible explanation for this unexpected result, as the model predicts a
negative sign, will be given in section 6.
Substitution of these parameter estimates in equation (5), enables us to calculate 1960 steady
state per capita income for each country. For the non-oil sample, the natural logarithms of these
are plotted in Figure 1 against those of real per capita income in 1960, where the bold line
indicates the equality of both values. Figure 1 shows that 43 countries are below this bold line,
i.e., these countries are converging from above their steady-state position. This result is only a
small change compared to the ‘49 countries’ of CG. For the OECD sample the results have even
deteriorated: the number of countries approaching from above has increased from 4 to 7 .
6
CG have shown that particularly the relatively poor countries converged from above their steady
state per capita income levels. Figure 1, however, shows that both rich (i.e. OECD countries) and
poor countries converge from above their steady state. Only 12 of the 22 OECD countries in the
non-oil sample were approaching their steady state from below.  





















































By using Young’s TFP growth rates to replace the common 2% rate of technological change by
country-specific rates, we have reduced the number of countries converging from above by less
than one might have expected. In the next section we will discuss a number of problems with
Young’s TFP estimates. Solving these problems will lead to improved estimates of TFP growth
rates estimates and will improve the results by reducing the number of countries converging from
above.9
4.  Re-estimating TFP Growth Rates
In the previous section we have shown that adjustment of the CG result for different rates of
labor-augmenting technological progress by using Young’s TFP estimates, only reduces the
number of countries in the non-oil sample approaching their 1960 steady state per capita income
from above from 49 to 43. For the OECD sample, this number even increases from 4 to 7. In our
opinion, this is due both to the fact that Young used a broader set of countries than MRW to
construct these TFP estimates, and the fact that Young’s TFP estimates relate to a different
period, i.e., 1970-1985, than MRW’s sample period. Using these TFP estimates to estimate 1960
steady state per capita income may lead to serious under- or overestimations. In this section we
will construct an alternative set of TFP estimates to overcome these problems.
Similar to Young, we will estimate TFP growth rates by performing a cross-country regression
of per capita output growth on the growth rate of the capital-labor ratio. The estimated residuals
can be interpreted as a country’s deviation from the estimated average rate of TFP growth. One
should keep in mind that these residuals also include a range of other ‘growth factors’, such as
changes in human capital, energy, capacity utilization and economies of scale. However, it should
be clear that this approach is to be preferred to just assuming a common 2% growth rate of labor-
augmenting technological change as MRW and CG do, thereby ignoring the fact that countries
experience different rates of technological progress (see e.g. Morrison, 1992).
To estimate equation (6) for the sample period 1960-1985, we need capital stock data for the
same period. Ideally, we would like to make use of the perpetual inventory method (PIM) to
construct the capital stock data. Because investment data are lacking for the ‘early years’ between
1950 and 1960 for a large number of countries in the Summers and Heston data set, we do not
use the PIM method to calculate the 1960 benchmark capital stock. Following the procedure
suggested in Griliches (1980), the benchmark capital stock is calculated by taking the investment
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  Thus:  , where ￿ = 0.03.
8
  As a comparison, for the non-oil sample the regression results assuming a depreciation rate
9
of 6% (cf. Young) are also given in Tables 2 and 3.
  Due to a lack of data, Sierra Leone and Sudan were excluded from the set of 98 countries
10
used by MRW and CG.
10
to the one assumed by MRW – plus an assumed growth rate of 5%.    Subsequent capital stock
8 9
values are then calculated by using the perpetual inventory method:
(7)
where K is the capital stock and I the investment flow. For those countries for which longer time
series of investment data are available in the Summers and Heston data set , we have calculated
10
the benchmark capital stock as far back as possible. These capital stock data are then used to
perform the cross-country regression as given in equation (6). The parameter estimates for both
the non-oil and OECD sample are reported in Table 2.
Table 2 TFP regression results
Non-oil
(1) Young -0.21 0.45 n.a.
(n.a.) (n.a.)
(2) TFP 0.068 0.521 0.496
￿ = 3% (0.287) (9.726)
(3) TFP 0.289 0.471 0.506
￿ = 6% (1.347) (9.905)
OECD
(4) TFP 0.292 0.601 0.848
￿ = 3% (1.203) (10.860)
Regression equation: 




  These are set at zero when estimating equation (4) and calculating the level of steady state
11
per capita income in equation (5).
  I.e., Belgium, Canada, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Spain and the US.
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For the non-oil sample, the TFP growth rates – for a depreciation rate of 3% – are shown in
Appendix B. For 57 countries the growth rate of TFP is positive, and 39 countries have
experienced a negative TFP growth.  We will use these TFP estimates to re-estimate the
11
augmented Solow-MRW model. The regression results as reported in Table 3 show that all
parameter estimates are significant and comparable to those obtained by MRW-CG (both in sign
and value), with the exception of the parameter for the technology variable which has the ‘wrong’
sign. Assuming a 6% depreciation rate to calculate capital stock data does not change the
parameter estimates, with the exception of the technology variable. Therefore, following MRW,
we will from now on focus on the results using a depreciation rate of 3% only.
Table 3 ‘Steady-state’ regression results: adjusted TFP estimates
#
Non-oil
(1) TFP 4.094 -0.178 0.324 0.488 0.153 0.485 35 (96)
￿=3% (6.914) (-2.838) (2.565) (5.607) (2.504)
(2) TFP 4.304 -0.169 0.538 0.467 0.140 0.498 35 (96)
￿=6% (7.266) (-2.758) (3.001) (5.356) (2.294)
OECD
(3) TFP 4.914 -0.402 -0.115 0.398 0.205 0.530 2 (22)
￿=3% (5.079) (-4.718) (-0.675) (1.977) (1.148)
Regression equation: 
t-values in parentheses; # = number of countries converging from above the steady state (total number of
countries)
Using these parameter estimates, we can estimate 1960 steady state per capita income levels for
each of the 96 non-oil countries. These are plotted against real per capita income in Figure 2,
which shows that 35 countries are still approaching their steady state from above. There is also
no clear distinction between richer and poorer countries. Seven out of the 22 OECD countries
are approaching their steady state from above .






















































For the OECD sample the estimated coefficients for the catch-up and technology variable differ
from those reported for the non-oil sample. The catch-up variable explains more of economic
growth, being more than twice as large (in absolute terms). The technology variable, although
statistically insignificant, shows the expected negative sign. The number of countries
approaching their steady state from above has dropped to only 2: Canada and Norway.
Although these results are an improvement compared to those based on Young’s TFP data ,
13
especially for the OECD sample, these results are not entirely convincing in supporting the
augmented Solow model. As explained before, our TFP estimates include a wide range of other
growth improving factors. In section 5, we will improve our TFP growth rates estimates by
introducing changes in human capital endowments in equation (6).ˆ Yt	 ˆ Lt
01( ˆ Kt	 ˆ Lt)2( ˆ Ht	 ˆ Lt)Et
0 1 2 ¯ R
2
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5.  Introducing Human Capital Growth: TFP Re-estimated
Improvements in educational or human capital endowments contribute to the growth performance
of countries to an important extent. It thus seems straightforward to take these improvements into
account when estimating TFP growth rates. We do this by adjusting our TFP growth equation
as follows:
(8)
where H is human capital.
Total gross enrollment ratio for secondary education
As a first proxy for human capital we take the 1960-1985 growth rate of the total gross
enrollment ratio for secondary education (ESS), which are taken from Barro and Lee (1994). The
parameter estimates of the TFP regression are presented in table 4.
Table 4 Human capital-augmented TFP regression estimates
Non-oil
(1) TFP-ESS 0.341 0.518 -0.047 0.502
(1.117) (9.710) (-1.411)
(2) TFP-YSS -0.113 0.518 0.062 0.499
(-0.403) (9.675) (1.210)
OECD
(3) TFP-ESS 0.350 0.614 -0.041 0.843
(1.342) (10.345) (-0.667)
(4) TFP-YSS 0.198 0.587 0.046 0.845
(0.726) (9.993) (0.767)





For both samples, the parameter of the growth rate of the capital-labor ratio is not sensitive to the
introduction of human capital growth in the TFP regression equation. For the non-oil sample it
reduces from 0.521 for regression (2) in Table 2 to 0.518. It is somewhat surprising to see that
human capital growth has a negative influence on TFP growth. Table 5 shows the regression
results for the steady-state growth equation. The parameter estimates are close to those reported
previously, but the number of countries approaching their steady state from above has now
increased from 35 to 42 for the non-oil sample. For the OECD sample, only 2 countries are still
approaching their steady state from above.
Average years of secondary schooling
As a second human capital proxy we use the growth rate of average years of secondary schooling
(YSS), which are taken from Barro and Lee (1994). Table 4 shows that the coefficient of the
human capital variable now has a positive sign but that it is statistically insignificant in the TFP
regression. Table 5 shows that the steady-state regression results are almost identical to those for
ESS, except that the number of countries converging from above has decreased significantly to
25 for the non-oil sample.
Table 5 ‘Steady-state’ regression results: human capital adjusted TFP data
#
Non-oil
(1) TFP-ESS 3.933 -0.168 0.314 0.478 0.145 0.487 42 (96)
(6.658) (-2.631) (2.618) (5.440) (2.344)
(2) TFP-YSS 4.135 -0.188 0.282 0.504 0.165 0.475 25 (96)
(6.894) (-2.981) (2.175) (5.781) (2.694)
OECD
(3) TFP-ESS 4.926 -0.403 -0.111 0.391 0.203 0.530 2 (22)
(5.102) (-4.705) (-0.683) (1.952) (1.146)
(4) TFP-YSS 4.858 -0.402 -0.144 0.406 0.215 0.537 2 (22)
(5.028) (-4.828) (-0.847) (2.023) (1.216)
Regression equation: 
ESS = enrollment ratio for secondary education, YSS = average years of secondary schooling; t-values in
parentheses; # = number of countries converging from above the steady state (total number of countries)ln(ng)
  I.e., Canada, Italy and Norway.
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Based on these empirical results, one may conclude that YSS is a better proxy for human capital
than ESS. A theoretical problem of the use of ESS growth rates as a proxy for human capital
growth is that the level of ESS is limited to an upper bound of 100%, making it by definition
more and more difficult to sustain high growth rates as the level of ESS increases. Although one
could argue that the YSS proxy also faces this problem, although to a far more limited extent,
we shall limit our analysis to YSS from now on.
For the non-oil sample, Figure 3 shows the steady state and real per capita income levels using
average years of secondary schooling. Only 3 of the 22 OECD countries are approaching their
steady state from above.  It thus seems that especially the poorer countries approach their steady
14
state from above if we adjust the TFP data for human capital growth.
For the OECD sample, the catch-up variable is once again relatively more important in
explaining economic growth. It is exactly equal to the one reported in Table 3, where the TFP
estimates were not adjusted for human capital changes. The technology variable has a negative
sign but is statistically insignificant. Once again, Canada and Norway are the only 2 countries
approaching their steady state from above.
Although we have been able to reduce the number of countries converging from above their
steady state from 49 (CG) to 25 for the non-oil sample, so far we have failed to solve one major
problem. The augmented Solow-MRW model predicts that the technology variable 
should have a negative sign. However, all regression results for the non-oil sample turn out to
have a positive sign for this variable. Hence, there seems to be a misspecification in the model
and we will drop the assumption of CRS in the next section. We will show that this will further

















































































  Note that we do not explicitly assume increasing or decreasing returns to scale.
15
  Rewriting equation (10) in growth rates yields B-type technological progress as a
16
combination of population growth and an exogenous progress rate. Population growth appears as an
argument in the TFP growth formulas derived by Arrow (1962), Phelps (1966) and Jones (1995).
17
6.  A-type vs. B-type Technological Change
The MRW model, which has been used as the basic model in the previous sections, assumes
constant returns to scale in all production inputs. As a result, the model predicts that the
technology variable   should have a negative sign. However, our empirical results for
MRW’s non-oil sample have shown that this variable turns out to be positive, a result clearly in
conflict with the model. We will therefore drop the assumption of CRS in all production inputs.
In this section we define so-called B-type technological change, and show that this will
significantly reduce the number of countries approaching their steady state from above.
Instead of assuming the CRS production function as given in equation (1a), we will start from
the following production function:
(9a)




Hence we find the following relation between A and B-type technological change:
(10)
In MRW’s CRS model, one might now use technological change B as expressed in equation (10),
instead of directly using A as MRW, CG and we have done previously.
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The equation which has to be estimated to calculate TFP growth rates has been adjusted to:
(11)
where (cf. equation (9a))  ,  ,   and  . The TFP regression
results with and without human capital (i.e.   by assumption) are given in Table 6 for the
non-oil and OECD sample.
Table 6 B-type TFP regression estimates
Non-oil
(1) TFP -0.328 0.524 0.187 0.499
(-0.829) (9.798) (1.249)
(2) TFP-YSS -0.504 0.520 0.061 0.185 0.502
(-1.197) (9.747) (1.203) (1.242)
OECD
(3) TFP 0.042 0.600 0.194 0.832
(0.109) (9.527) (1.194)
(4) TFP-YSS -0.089 0.611 0.056 0.139 0.841
(-0.194) (9.148) (0.903) (0.781)
YSS = average years of schooling; t-values in parentheses.
Once again the parameter of the growth rate of the capital-labor ratio is not very sensitive,
because it is almost the same as those reported in Tables 2 and 4. The coefficient for human
capital growth increases from 0.046 in Table 4 to 0.056 for the OECD sample, but is identical
for the non-oil sample in Tables 4 and 6. Human capital growth and the ‘additional’ labor term
are statistically insignificant for all regressions reported in Table 6.
Using the estimates in Table 6, we calculate TFP growth rates (see appendix D). These growth















Equation (12) shows that the growth rate of B-type technological change depends positively on
TFP growth and labor growth. Substituting the estimated coefficients from Table 6 in equation
(12) shows that the parameter for TFP growth is roughly about 5 times that of labor growth. The
estimates for B are now first substituted for g in equation (4) to estimate the  parameters, and
second for g in equation (5) to calculate the steady state per capita income levels in 1960.
Table 7 ‘Steady-state’ regression results (B-type technological change)
#
Non-oil
(1) TFP 4.164 -0.214 0.184 0.530 0.186 0.456 28 (96)
(6.671) (-3.289) (1.130) (6.044) (3.009)
(2) TFP: YSS 4.100 -0.231 0.091 0.539 0.197 0.450 22 (96)
(6.443) (-3.547) (0.546) (6.146) (3.200)
OECD
(3) TFP 4.367 -0.393 -0.276 0.387 0.220 0.577 2 (22)
(4.396) (-5.086) (-1.555) (2.041) (1.361)
(4) TFP: YSS 4.182 -0.397 -0.346 0.374 0.233 0.593 0 (22)
(4.177) (-5.227) (-1.779) (2.011) (1.463)
Regression equation: 
YSS = average years of secondary schooling; t-values in parentheses, # = number of countries converging
from above the steady state (total number of countries)
The regression results are shown in Table 7. With the exception of the technology variable, all
parameters have the expected sign and are almost identical to those reported previously. The
technology variable is now statistically insignificant. The number of non-oil countries converging
from above their steady state has decreased to 28 when the TFP data are not corrected for human
capital growth, and to 22 when we include human capital growth in calculating TFP growth rates.
This latter result is graphically shown in Figure 4. This figure shows that all OECD countries in



















































confirmed by the regression results for the OECD sample. For the OECD sample, the technology
variable has a negative sign and is statistically significant at a 10% level.
Dropping the assumption of CRS, by introducing B-type technological change, has reduced the
number of countries converging from above their steady state to 22 for the non-oil sample and
even 0 for the OECD sample. However, the results in this section call for further testing of the
CRS specification of the production function. In the next section we will test various restricted
regressions to see whether this assumption should be rejected.ln(sk)l n ( sh)l n ( ng)
ln(yt)	ln(y0)
01ln(y0)3 ln(sk)	ln(ng) 4 ln(sh)	ln(ng)
R 2
 
  I.e., Canada, Ireland, Italy, Norway and the US.
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7.  Testing for Constant Returns to Scale: Restricted Regressions
In this section we will take a closer look at the restricted augmented Solow model by imposing
the restriction that the coefficients of  ,   and   sum to zero:
(13)
The regression results are summarized in Table 8. For the non-oil sample, the regression
coefficients of the restricted and non-restricted MRW regression are almost the same. The
number of countries approaching from above their steady state is exactly the same. For the
Young-adjusted regression, all coefficients turn out to be insignificant and the adjusted   is
almost zero. There is no clear explanation for these results, and the fact that the number of
countries approaching the steady state from above has decreased from 43 to 37 is thus an
insignificant drop.
The coefficients for the B-type technological change regressions with and without human capital
adjusted TFP data are now almost identical to those found by MRW. Compared to the
unrestricted regressions (cf. Table 7) the coefficient for investment has decreased from, on
average, 0.535 to 0.385. The human capital parameter shows an average increase from 0.192 to
0.217. The best results, based on the number of countries converging from above, are now
obtained for B-type technological change when the TFP data are not adjusted for human capital
growth. Figure 5 shows that there are now only 16 countries approaching their steady state from
above, including 5 OECD countries.
17
Table 8 also shows the implied values for  ,   and  . Once again, these results are almost
identical to those reported by MRW. The implied coefficient for the capital stock in equation (9a)
is equal to, on average, 0.452, only slightly below the value of 0.484 as reported in regression (1).
The coefficient for the human capital stock is roughly equal to 0.255 as compared to the MRWt
	ln(0.5)/





























  The time to move halfway to steady state is given by  .
18
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value of 0.228. As compared to MRW-CG, convergence to the steady state takes more time, from
roughly 50 years for MRW-CG to 60 years for our B-type technological change .
18
Table 8 ‘Steady-state’ restricted regression results




(1) MRW-CG 2.457 -0.298 0.501 0.235 0.014 0.484 0.228 0.700 0.465 49 (98)
(5.195) (-4.931) (6.092) (3.975)
(2) ‘Young’- 0.797 -0.050 0.113 0.120 0.002 0.399 0.424 97.355 0.054 37 (98)
adjusted (1.228) (-0.600) (1.078) (1.468)
(3) TFP(B) 2.048 -0.240 0.376 0.214 0.011 0.453 0.258 32.442 0.272 16 (96)
(3.540) (-3.193) (3.897) (3.008)
(4) TFP(B)- 2.157 -0.259 0.393 0.220 0.012 0.450 0.252 24.477 0.311 22 (96)
YSS (3.863) (-3.569) (4.257) (3.197)
OECD
(5) MRW-CG 3.554 -0.402 0.395 0.241 0.021 0.381 0.232 0.654 0.659 4 (22)
(5.608) (-5.814) (2.605) (1.694)
(6) ‘Young’- 3.538 -0.327 0.030 -0.059 0.016 0.102 -0.198 6.740 0.404 7 (22)
adjusted (4.192) (-3.476) (0.157) (0.172)
(7) TFP(B) 3.473 -0.373 0.241 0.153 0.019 0.314 0.200 1.733 0.562 2 (22)
(4.836) (-4.844) (1.564) (0.984)
(8) TFP(B)- 3.477 -0.384 0.267 0.191 0.019 0.317 0.227 1.006 0.594 0 (22)
YSS (5.028) (-5.143) (1.782) (1.248)
Regression equation:
implied  , implied   and implied  ;
YSS = average years of secondary schooling; t-values in parentheses, # = number of countries converging
from above the steady state (total number of countries)
The F value is defined as  , where   resp.   is the residual sum of squares
a  
of the restricted and unrestricted regression respectively, m is the number of linear restrictions, k is the
number of parameters in the unrestricted regression and N is the number of observations. The F statistic
follows the F distribution with m, (N-k) degrees of freedom. The decision rule (see Gujarati, 1988) to test
the null hypothesis of CRS is: if the computed F exceeds  , where  is the critical
F at the ￿ level of significance, we may reject the null hypothesis of CRS, otherwise we may accept it.

   Gujarati (1988) gives the following critical F values:
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￿ = 0.25 ￿ = 0.10 ￿ = 0.05 ￿ = 0.01
m = 1, N - k = 18 1.41 3.01 4.41 8.29
m = 1, N - k = 60 1.35 2.79 4.00 7.08
m = 1, N - k = 120 1.34 2.75 3.92 6.85
23
An explicit testing for this CRS restriction is by F statistics as reported in Table 8. For the non-
oil sample, only for the MRW-CG regression the observed F value is significant (at the 1%
level) , and we may thus accept the null hypothesis of CRS. For the B-type regressions in Table
19
8, CRS is strongly rejected, as the observed F values are not even significant at a 25% level of
significance.
For the OECD sample, the restricted regressions give results close to those found by MRW-CG.
The number of countries approaching from above decreases to 0 for the human capital adjusted
TFP growth rates regression, a result identical to that of the non-restricted regression. For the
OECD sample it is this regression which gives the best results, as opposed to the non-oil sample,
where it is best not to include human capital to estimate TFP growth rates. The implied  ,   and
 are identical to those reported by MRW-CG. Only if we assume a 25% level of significance,
we may reject the null hypothesis of CRS for regression (7). For the MRW-CG regression and
for the regression with human capital adjusted TFP growth rates, the hypothesis of CRS cannot
be rejected.
Although the restricted regressions perform best in reducing the number of countries approaching
their steady state from above, we cannot accept these results for the non-oil sample based on the
rejection of the null hypothesis of CRS. Therefore, the B-type technological change results as
reported in section 6  are theoretically and empirically the best we have found for the non-oil
sample. Regression (2) in Table 7, where TFP growth rates are adjusted for changes in human
capital endowments, turns out to be our benchmark regression in comparison to the MRW-CG
result. The number of countries approaching their steady state from above has been reduced from



















































sign for the technology variable and the rejection of CRS for B-type technological change, is not
supporting the augmented Solow model.
For the OECD sample, the best results are found for the restricted regression with TFP data
adjusted for human capital growth: regression (8) in Table 8. Whereas for the non-oil sample the
support for the Solow model has been both weakened and strengthened, the results for the OECD
sample are clearly in favor of the augmented Solow model. This seems to suggest that economic
growth in non-OECD countries differs from that in the more developed OECD economies.25
8.  Conclusions
Our work restores the expected Solowian result that countries are expected to approach their
steady state from an initial situation of being poorer than at the steady state. This is done firstly
by giving up the assumption of technology being a pure public good and countries therefore
having identical rates of technological progress. This assumption is replaced by the assumption
that countries have different exogenous rates of technological progress. As the assumption of
country-specific rates of technological progress yields more plausible results than that of a pure
public good property of technology, our work provides some justification for the work of those
economists who have tried to endogenize TFP growth by taking into account country-specific
arguments.
Secondly, we have included changes in human capital endowments to estimate TFP growth rates.
By reducing the ‘residual factor’, these improved TFP growth rates further reduced the number
of countries approaching their steady state from above.
Finally, we have dropped the assumption of constant returns to scale by introducing B-type
technological change. Although the results improved, the regression results did not provide
sufficient support in favor of either increasing or decreasing returns to scale. Hence we have
tested for CRS by performing restricted regressions. Although the results have improved
significantly,  the assumption of CRS had to be rejected for the non-oil sample.
The number of non-oil countries approaching their steady state from per capita income levels
above those in the steady state has been reduced from 49 as reported by CG to 22 for the B-type
technological change regression with TFP growth rates adjusted for changes in human capital
endowments (cf. regression (2) in Table 7). As the number of countries approaching their steady
state from above has decreased from 50% to only 23%, our analysis is in support of the
augmented Solow model. However, the rejection of CRS for the non-oil sample sharply collides
with the assumptions of this model.
Only when the analysis is limited to the sample of OECD countries, is the Solow model strongly
supported by both a strong reduction in the number of countries approaching their steady state26
from above, and by the acception of the CRS assumption. All countries now approach their
steady state from above, and the technology variable shows the expected negative sign.
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Appendix A. Relative percentage annual growth of Total Factor Productivity, 
1970-1985 (Young)
Egypt 3.500 Turkey 0.800 Morocco 0.000 
Pakistan 3.000 Netherlands 0.800 Nigeria 0.000 
Botswana 2.900 Ethiopia 0.700 Haiti 0.000 
Congo Peop. Rep. 2.800  Austria 0.700  Benin 0.000 
Syrian Arab Rep. 2.500  Australia 0.700  Madagascar 0.000 
Hong  Kong 2.500 Kenya 0.600 Sudan 0.000 
Cameroon 2.400 Spain 0.600 Ivory  Coast 0.000 
Zimbabwe 2.400 France 0.500 Senegal 0.000 
Tunisia 2.400 Liberia 0.400 Zambia 0.000 
Uganda 2.100 Honduras 0.400 Mozambique 0.000 
Bangladesh 1.900 Paraguay 0.400 Angola 0.000 
Thailand 1.900 Portugal 0.400 Bolivia 0.000 
Italy 1.800 Belgium 0.400 Philippines 0.000 
Norway 1.700  United States 0.400  Papua New Guinea 0.000 
Finland 1.500 Algeria 0.300 Dominican  Rep. 0.000 
Burma 1.400 Canada 0.300 El  Salvador 0.000 
Korea Rep. of 1.400  Central Afr. Rep 0.200  Jordan 0.000 
Ecuador 1.400 India 0.100 Guatemala 0.000 
Mauritius 1.300 Sri  Lanka 0.100 Jamaica 0.000 
Denmark 1.300 Singapore 0.100 Nicaragua 0.000 
Greece 1.200 Rwanda 0.000 Peru 0.000 
Japan 1.200 Sierra  Leone 0.000 Costa  Rica 0.000 
Israel 1.200 Burkina  Faso 0.000 Mexico 0.000 
Tanzania 1.100 Niger 0.000 Ireland 0.000 
Colombia 1.100 Zaire 0.000 S.  Africa 0.000 
Malawi 1.000 Burundi 0.000 Argentina 0.000 
Brazil 1.000 Mauritania 0.000 Uruguay 0.000 
Malaysia 1.000 Togo 0.000 Chile 0.000 
Sweden 1.000 Nepal 0.000 Trinidad  Tobago 0.000 
Panama 0.900 Indonesia 0.000 New  Zealand 0.000 
United  Kingdom 0.900 Somalia 0.000 Switzerland 0.000 
Germany Fed Rep 0.900  Chad 0.000  Venezuela 0.000 
Mali 0.800 Ghana 0.000 
Source: Young (1994), Table 3.28
Appendix B. Relative percentage annual growth of Total Factor Productivity, 
1960-1985 (=3%)
Hong Kong 3.590 Netherlands 0.588 Chile 0.000
Congo Peop. Rep. 3.345 Austria 0.533 Costa Rica 0.000
Morocco 2.103 Senegal 0.518 El Salvador 0.000
Syrian Arab Rep. 1.895 France 0.408 Ethiopia 0.000
Zimbabwe 1.708 Singapore 0.403 Haiti 0.000
Israel 1.685 Tunisia 0.395 India 0.000
Kenya 1.539 S. Africa 0.391 Jamaica 0.000
Norway 1.405 Turkey 0.390 Madagascar 0.000
Korea Rep. of 1.349 Ivory Coast 0.384 Malawi 0.000
Italy 1.244 Germany Fed Rep 0.375 Mali 0.000
Colombia 1.203 Mauritius 0.337 Mauritania 0.000
Greece 1.177 Malaysia 0.309 Mozambique 0.000
Egypt 1.174 Denmark 0.239 Nepal 0.000
Ecuador 1.164 Honduras 0.235 Nicaragua 0.000
Ireland 1.143 Jordan 0.232 Niger 0.000
Algeria 1.098 Mexico 0.210 Nigeria 0.000
Japan 1.057 Zambia 0.186 Papua New Guinea 0.000
Brazil 1.049 Sweden 0.175 Paraguay 0.000
Liberia 1.043 Peru 0.173 Philippines 0.000
Canada 0.919 Cameroon 0.122 Rwanda 0.000
Burma 0.851 Guatemala 0.071 Somalia 0.000
Botswana 0.844 Ghana 0.036 Sri Lanka 0.000
Finland 0.810 New Zealand 0.015 Switzerland 0.000
Panama 0.808 Dominican Rep. 0.003 Tanzania 0.000
Pakistan 0.767 United Kingdom 0.000 Togo 0.000
Portugal 0.767 Indonesia 0.000 Trinidad Tobago 0.000
Bolivia 0.766 Angola 0.000 Uganda 0.000
Belgium 0.755 Argentina 0.000 Uruguay 0.000
Bangladesh 0.748 Benin 0.000 Venezuela 0.000
Spain 0.724 Burkina Faso 0.000 Zaire 0.000
Thailand 0.651 Burundi 0.000 Sierra Leone n.a.
Australia 0.608 Central Afr. Rep 0.000 Sudan n.a.
United States 0.601 Chad 0.000
n.a. = not available29
Appendix C. Relative percentage annual growth of Total Factor Productivity, 
adjusted for human capital growth (average years of secondary 
schooling), 1960-1985 (=3%)
Hong Kong 3.441 S. Africa 0.402 Indonesia 0.000
Congo Peop. Rep. 3.185 Ivory Coast 0.401 Jamaica 0.000
Morocco 2.111 Singapore 0.374 Jordan 0.000
Israel 1.584 Senegal 0.289 Madagascar 0.000
Syrian Arab Rep. 1.470 Germany Fed Rep 0.275 Malawi 0.000
Zimbabwe 1.440 Netherlands 0.268 Mali 0.000
Kenya 1.278 Austria 0.209 Mauritania 0.000
Egypt 1.191 Turkey 0.192 Mozambique 0.000
Korea Rep. of 1.114 Denmark 0.172 Nepal 0.000
Italy 1.073 France 0.148 New Zealand 0.000
Norway 1.034 Malaysia 0.110 Nicaragua 0.000
Ireland 1.022 Mauritius 0.090 Niger 0.000
Colombia 0.999 Sweden 0.081 Nigeria 0.000
Japan 0.979 Cameroon 0.081 Papua New Guinea 0.000
Brazil 0.963 Tunisia 0.050 Paraguay 0.000
Greece 0.941 Mexico 0.005 Peru 0.000
Ecuador 0.885 Angola 0.000 Philippines 0.000
Canada 0.824 Argentina 0.000 Rwanda 0.000
Liberia 0.814 Benin 0.000 Somalia 0.000
Bolivia 0.783 Burkina Faso 0.000 Sri Lanka 0.000
Algeria 0.733 Burundi 0.000 Switzerland 0.000
Burma 0.702 Central Afr. Rep 0.000 Tanzania 0.000
Belgium 0.651 Chad 0.000 Togo 0.000
Panama 0.651 Chile 0.000 Trinidad Tobago 0.000
Botswana 0.627 Costa Rica 0.000 Uganda 0.000
Pakistan 0.589 Dominican Rep. 0.000 United Kingdom 0.000
Australia 0.561 El Salvador 0.000 Uruguay 0.000
Finland 0.546 Ethiopia 0.000 Venezuela 0.000
Bangladesh 0.527 Ghana 0.000 Zaire 0.000
United States 0.500 Guatemala 0.000 Zambia 0.000
Thailand 0.443 Haiti 0.000 Sierra Leone n.a.
Portugal 0.422 Honduras 0.000 Sudan n.a.
Spain 0.411 India 0.000
n.a. = not available30
Appendix D. Relative percentage annual growth of Total Factor Productivity, 
adjusted for human capital growth (average years of secondary 
schooling), no constant returns to scale, 1960-1985 (=3%)
Hong Kong 2.861 Pakistan 0.072 Mozambique 0.000
Congo Peop. Rep. 2.754 S. Africa 0.001 Nepal 0.000
Morocco 1.598 Angola 0.000 Netherlands 0.000
Israel 1.019 Argentina 0.000 New Zealand 0.000
Italy 0.996 Benin 0.000 Nicaragua 0.000
Zimbabwe 0.949 Burkina Faso 0.000 Niger 0.000
Syrian Arab Rep. 0.934 Burundi 0.000 Nigeria 0.000
Ireland 0.865 Cameroon 0.000 Papua New Guinea 0.000
Greece 0.830 Central Afr. Rep 0.000 Paraguay 0.000
Egypt 0.777 Chad 0.000 Peru 0.000
Norway 0.748 Chile 0.000 Philippines 0.000
Japan 0.713 Costa Rica 0.000 Rwanda 0.000
Kenya 0.691 Denmark 0.000 Senegal 0.000
Korea Rep. of 0.549 Dominican Rep. 0.000 Singapore 0.000
Belgium 0.526 El Salvador 0.000 Somalia 0.000
Colombia 0.495 Ethiopia 0.000 Sri Lanka 0.000
Ecuador 0.406 France 0.000 Sweden 0.000
Bolivia 0.385 Ghana 0.000 Switzerland 0.000
Finland 0.384 Guatemala 0.000 Tanzania 0.000
Brazil 0.381 Haiti 0.000 Thailand 0.000
Liberia 0.369 Honduras 0.000 Togo 0.000
Canada 0.342 India 0.000 Trinidad Tobago 0.000
Algeria 0.320 Indonesia 0.000 Tunisia 0.000
Burma 0.313 Ivory Coast 0.000 Turkey 0.000
Spain 0.267 Jamaica 0.000 Uganda 0.000
Bangladesh 0.218 Jordan 0.000 United Kingdom 0.000
Portugal 0.202 Madagascar 0.000 Uruguay 0.000
Germany Fed Rep 0.179 Malawi 0.000 Venezuela 0.000
Austria 0.163 Malaysia 0.000 Zaire 0.000
Botswana 0.154 Mali 0.000 Zambia 0.000
United States 0.143 Mauritania 0.000 Sierra Leone n.a.
Australia 0.123 Mauritius 0.000 Sudan n.a.
Panama 0.112 Mexico 0.000
n.a. = not available